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ABSTRACT
A common practice in the fields of education, mental health, and juvenile justice is to segregate
problem youths in groups with deviant peers. Assignments of this sort, which concentrate deviant
youths, may facilitate deviant peer influence and lead to perverse outcomes. This possibility adds
to the list of arguments in support of "mainstreaming" whenever possible. But there are other
concerns that help justify segregated-group assignments, including efficiency of service delivery
and protection of the public. Our analysis organizes the discussion about the relevant tradeoffs.
First, the number of deviant youths (relative to the size of the relevant population, or to the
number of assignment locations) affects whether the harm-minimizing assignment calls for
diffusion or segregation. Second, the nature of the problematic behavior is relevant; behavior
which has a direct, detrimental effect on others who share the assignment makes a stronger case
for segregation. Third, the capacity for behavior control matters, and may make the difference in
a choice between segregation and integration.  We briefly discuss the empirical literature, which
with some exceptions is inadequate to the task of providing clear guidance about harm-
minimizing assignment strategies.  Finally, we reflect briefly on the medical-practice principle
"first do no harm," and contrast it with the claims of potential victims of deviants.
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A common practice in the fields of education, mental health, and juvenile justice 
is to segregate problem youths in groups with deviant peers.  In education, disruptive or 
delinquent youths may be assigned to self-contained classrooms for in-school detention, 
or even to alternative schools.  In mental health interventions, conduct-disordered youths 
and drug abusers may be assigned to group therapy or placed with similar youths in 
group homes and day-treatment programs.  In the juvenile justice system youths are 
placed with other offenders in camps, training schools, and detention centers.  It is 
entirely possible that assignments of this sort, which concentrate deviant youths, may 
lead to perverse outcomes.  Instead of helping their transition to a healthier, more 
productive trajectory, these assignments may actually facilitate a greater commitment to 
deviant behavior.  The result may be an increase in the rate or seriousness of problem 
behaviors, either during the course of the placement or in subsequent years (McCord, 
2003; Dishion, McCord and Poulin, 2002). 
This possibility of an iatrogenic effect from interventions with troubled and 
troublesome youths is relevant in designing policy, and adds to the list of arguments in 
support of “mainstreaming” or diffusing them among other youths whenever possible.  
But there are other concerns that help justify segregated-group assignments.  Delivery of 
treatment through specialized resources may be accomplished more efficiently in settings 
dedicated to that purpose, and that may also be true in monitoring and controlling the 
behavior of conduct-disordered youths.  In any event, segregating such youths has the 
desirable effect of insulating other youths and adults from them.  And the threat of   4 
assignment to in-school detention or a training school may have some deterrent effect on 
bad behavior.  In considering alternative assignment policies, the validity and strength of 
these rationales should be weighed against the possible perverse results from 
concentrating deviant youths. 
Our analysis is intended to help organize the discussion about these tradeoffs.  
First, we show that the number of deviant youths (relative to the size of the relevant 
population, or to the number of assignment options) may well determine whether the 
harm-minimizing assignment calls for diffusion, segregation, or some of both.  Second, 
the way in which individual behavior cumulates to collective harm can be of considerable 
relevance in characterizing the harm-minimizing assignment; in cases where bad 
behavior has a direct, detrimental effect on others who share the assignment (including 
youths who are not deviant), then there is a stronger case for segregation than when harm 
occurs outside of the assignment location.  Third, the capacity for behavior control 
matters, and may make the difference in a choice between segregation and integration; an 
innovation that enhances control over disruptive youths may make integration more 
attractive. 
We briefly discuss the empirical literature, which is typically inadequate to the 
task of providing clear guidance about harm-minimizing assignment strategies.  
Empirical investigations often focus just on the behavior of deviant youths under 
different assignments, without considering the effects on others or the overall social costs 
of the assignments.   There are some exceptional cases where the evidence, while limited, 
may nonetheless be sufficient. 
   5 
Given the inherent complexity of the assignment problem and the limited 
evidence, decisions will have to be made under uncertainty about costs and 
consequences.  Furthermore, alternative assignment possibilities are likely to bring into 
conflict the interests of the deviant youths, other youths, and the taxpayers. Under these 
circumstances, is there an ethical obligation to give priority to the interests of the group 
that is to be directly acted on – the deviants?  We reflect briefly on the medical-practice 
principle “first do no harm,” and contrast it with the claims of potential victims of 
deviants. 
The conceptual and methodological matters discussed here are also relevant to 
most any policy dilemma involving sorting and mixing of different sorts of people across 
locations.   In what follows we do not always use deviant youth as the exemplar, but refer 
to examples involving race and residential location of families in poverty.  
 
Conceptual Issues 
Much of the relevant literature has been concerned with establishing whether the 
decision of how to distribute deviant youths across locations (assignments) has an effect 
on their behavior.   That inference has proven quite challenging in practice, as we discuss 
in a subsequent section.  But even when this empirical effort produces reliable results, it 
may leave us far short of having the information necessary to make a normative 
judgment.  To make that judgment, it is also necessary to make inferences about how the 
assignment affects the quantity and distribution of total harm to anyone affected by the 
assignment, including bystanders. 
   6 
One important distinction is whether the harm is limited to the individuals judged 
to be at risk, or whether their behavior victimizes others as well.  If there are victims, then 
it is important to distinguish between cases where the victims are in the same assigned 
location, or are outsiders.   These distinctions suggest three logical cases: no other 
victims, victims elsewhere, victims in the assigned location.  In what follows we combine 
the first two cases and contrast it with the third.  The distinction, then, is whether the 
behavior harms those who share the assigned location or not.  The two types are labeled 
“D” and “S.” 
Type D encompasses those behaviors that have an effect on others who share the 
assigned location, such as classroom disruption (hence the “D”) and bullying.  
 
Type S behaviors are those that do not have a direct impact on others who share 
the assignment.  Included here are a variety of harms to the deviant youths 
themselves both during and after the particular assignment in question.  Examples 
include smoking (the “S”), alcohol and drug abuse, and inattention to schoolwork.  
But this category is not limited to “victimless” behaviors.  Also included are gang 
involvement and other criminal activity, as long as their impact is outside of the 
assigned location. 
Of course it is quite possible that D and S behaviors are both affected by the assignment. 
To gain leverage on the assignment problem, we stipulate several simplifying 
assumptions and refer specifically to the school official’s task of assigning students to 
classrooms.  The students are of two sorts, “non-deviants” (the As) and “deviants” (the 
Bs); their identities are pre-determined and known to the official.  There are a fixed   7 
number of classrooms and teachers.  The considerations relevant to the official’s decision 
will depend on the nature of the problem behavior.   
The consequences within the classroom of Type D behavior are obviously 
relevant in assigning students.  Other considerations may also come to bear for both types 
of students.  Most interesting is the possibility of social influence among deviant peers.  
The actual behavior of a deviant youth (either D or S) may well depend on whether there 
are other deviant youths in the same classroom to serve as models, guides, accomplices, 
or an appreciative audience.   
Also relevant is the capacity of teachers and other resources to influence bad 
behavior in the classroom or outside it.  If such influence is possible, whether exercised 
through discipline or some sort of constructive (therapeutic) programming, then the 
actual behavior of deviant youths will depend on the level of resources relative to the 
“load” in the classroom.  Resource considerations may lend weight to a prescription for 
either diffusion or segregation of deviant youths, depending on what might be deemed the 
“technology of control.”   
This conceptual setup provides the basis for developing some guidance for the 
assignment problem.  Of the various assumptions, the one that may seem most artificial is 
that there are only two types of youths (A and B).  One generalization is to assume that 
youths form a continuum with respect to their propensity to engage in deviant behavior, 
ranging from those who will initiate it under most any circumstance to those who require 
a powerful stimulus, such as a complete breakdown of order. While this generalization is 
more flexible and realistic, we stick with the more tractable assumption of a dichotomy 
for now.  Whether dichotomy or continuum, the mix of propensities can be understood as   8 
producing aggregate behavior that is conditioned on peer influence and external social 
control.   
Another note on the basic setup:  While our discussion is for the most part 
presented with reference to the problem of distributing students among classrooms, or 
among schools, the logic is applicable to a variety of other assignment problems.   For 
example, the state of North Carolina is in the process of demolishing its large juvenile 
corrections institutions and is building a series of smaller units.  Among the relevant 
questions are how large these new units should be and whether the protocol for assigning 
juveniles among them call for concentrating the most serious delinquents or mixing them 
in with the rest of the population.   Other examples from the school context include those 
facing a district school system: whether to start an alternative school for deviant students, 
whether to locate ninth graders in middle school or high school, and whether to retain 
large numbers of failing students for a repeat in grade.
1  More broadly, it is relevant to 
any scheme that re-sorts youths across neighborhoods or schools, including housing 
relocation programs and school voucher programs.  We return to these examples in the 
empirical section. 
 
Case I: Assignment when there is no contagion and no control 
If deviant peers do not influence others’ behavior, and the issue of concern is 
limiting Type S behavior (smoking, crime outside the classroom, etc.), then the 
assignment problem appears trivial:  The amount of Type S behavior would not be 
affected by how students are sorted among classrooms.  Two exceptions should be noted: 
First, in some cases the assignment to a segregated classroom is justified as punishment, 
                                                 
1 Thanks to Al Blumstein for suggesting these examples.   9 
as in the case of in-school detention.  One rationale is that the threat of such an 
assignment will deter bad behavior.  Second is the possibility that deviant behavior is 
influenced by the capacity of the teacher and other resources to influence such behavior.  
A discussion of that possibility is left for the next section. 
For disruptive (Type D) behavior, the assignment matters even if there is no social 
influence.  In a recent theoretical article that analyzes this circumstance, Edward Lazear 
(2001) provides a rationale for segregation.  He postulates that any one student can 
disrupt the productive teaching and learning activity in the classroom for a spell, and that 
some students are more prone to being disruptive than others.  Lazear sets up the analysis 
by assuming two types of students: “A” students are non-disruptive all but a fraction of 
the time given by (1-pA), while the “B” students are disruptive a larger fraction (1-pB) of 
the time.  Under the assumption that episodes of disruption are uncorrelated random 
events, the total amount of productive, non-disrupted time is given by the product  
pA
a pB
b, where the exponents a and b signify the number of A and B students respectively.  
The cumulative harm (assumed proportional to unproductive time) due to Type D 
behavior in any one classroom is then 
  1 - pA
a pB
b 
and total harm associated with any given assignment of students to classrooms is the sum 
over all classrooms. 
Under this setup, consider the marginal cost to the students in a classroom (in 
terms of additional time lost to disruption) of replacing an A student with a B student in 





b+1  =  pA
a pB
b [ 1- pA
-1 pB ],    10 
which is a positive number because by assumption pA > pB.  This marginal cost declines 
as the number of B students, b, grows.  The intuition here is simply that the marginal cost 
of an extra B student is in the form of a proportional reduction in non-disrupted time.  As 
B increases, that proportion is applied to a shrinking base of productive teaching time,  
pA
a pB
b.  One more disruptive kid added to a classroom that is already mostly out of 
control makes little difference to the amount of teaching and learning that takes place 
there. 
The mathematical result under Lazear’s assumptions is that an assignment that 
separates all the A students from the Bs, placing them in different classrooms, maximizes 
the total amount of non-disrupted time, and hence minimizes total harm.
2  If that is the 
goal, then segregation is the answer.  Of course, that segregated assignment may raise an 
equity concern, since the B students will end up with a more meager educational 
opportunity than the A students.  That concern may be more compelling if the 
“disruption” in question takes the form of epileptic seizures or failure to follow directions 
due to ADHD, rather than to clowning or getting in fights; if the latter behaviors are 
viewed (rightly or wrongly) as volitional and the former not, then we might be more 
hesitant to assign the former group to an inferior placement.  The question of whose 
interests should have priority is a deep one, to which we return at the end of the paper. 
Other assumptions may lead to still different conclusions.  The robust lesson from 
this analysis is that social contagion is not the only mechanism that should be considered 
in making assignments – the influence that youths’ behavior has on the productivity of 
the classroom, or (more generally) the wellbeing of other students, may also be relevant.  
                                                 
2 If there are not enough B students to fill a classroom, then they should still be assigned to the same room, 
filling in with As.    11 
That set of concerns raises issues of both fairness and overall harm to the affected 
population.    
 
Case II: Assignment when resources matter 
In Case I, we assumed that the youths’ behavior is exogenous, not influenced by 
the classroom context.  A more realistic assumption is that the amount and quality of 
behavior depends on the circumstances.   A “deviant youth” can then be identified as one 
that has relatively high potential for exhibiting deviant behavior, in the sense that it 
doesn’t take much of a stimulus to set them off.   In particular, the presence of other 
deviant youths may facilitate this potential.  Here we consider one mechanism by which 
that may happen, the dilution of authority.  The next section addresses another 
mechanism of this sort, direct social influence. 
Assume each classroom has a teacher who exerts some control over the behavior 
of the students.  The focus here is again on disruptive (D) behavior.  A teacher may be 
able to “handle” one or two disruptive kids in her classroom, constraining their tendency 
to disrupt the proceedings, but at some point the “load” on her will become too great.  
Discipline will begin to break down, and the deviant (B) students’ disruptive tendencies 
will be given greater scope. 
When authority is subject to dilution, then the best assignment of students to 
classrooms will depend on the capacity of teachers – what “load” can they “handle” – and 
the number of Type B youths relative to the total number of classrooms.  For example, if 
each teacher is capable of fully constraining one B student at most, and there are fewer B 
students than classrooms, then the harm-minimizing assignment is to disperse the B   12 
students so there is no more than one anywhere.  Note that that assignment is not random, 
but rather requires an explicit policy of identifying and assigning the Bs with an eye to 
the load per teacher.
3 
If there are more B students than classrooms, then the nature of the harm-
minimizing assignment may still be dispersion, or it may become segregation.  In general 
the answer will depend on how behavior and control capacity interact.   
The addition of another B into a classroom has both a direct and indirect effect on 
total disruption in that classroom.  The direct effect is whatever that new youth adds to 
the total, given the circumstances.  The indirect effect stems from the fact that the 
addition of that youth changes the circumstances by diluting control capacity, with the 
result that the behavior of all Bs in that classroom may deteriorate. 
This is a familiar dynamic in community youth programs, mental health 
placements, and, most obviously, the criminal-justice area.  If, for example, a new 
criminal gang forms, its crimes will add to the load on the local police department and 
court system.  Unless there is excess capacity, the result is likely to be a reduction in the 
probability and severity of punishment for any given crime.  With the sanction threat 
reduced, criminal activity will become more profitable, with the result of further 
increases in the crime rate and further dilution of criminal-justice resources.  The new 
“equilibrium” may be characterized by a much higher crime rate than could be explained 
in a direct sense by the formation of that new gang.  This type of vicious cycle has been 
                                                 
3 While systematic dispersion of Bs is ideal, it may not be feasible.  In that case it is of interest to ask 
whether random assignment would be better than segregation.  The answer will depend on the shape of the 
function relating concentration to disruption.   13 
used, for example, to explain the extraordinarily high rates of homicide in Columbia 
(Gaviria, 2000).
4    
While it is certainly possible to adapt the Lazear model (discussed under Case I) 
to this new circumstance, there is not much to be learned, since the implications for the 
harm-minimizing assignment will be sensitive to the specific assumptions about how 
behavior responds to dilution of control.    Some qualitative statements can be made if we 
stipulate a sharp threshold phenomenon with respect to “load.” First, if there are too 
many Bs to keep every classroom inside this threshold, then some segregated classrooms 
may be part of the harm-minimizing solution so that the other classrooms can remain 
relatively calm.  That is to say, the harm-minimizing solution will entail a combination of 
diffusion and segregation.  Second, if teachers differ in their capacity to handle Bs, then 
the assignment should be adjusted accordingly.  Similarly, if there are extra control 
resources that can be allocated, then they should be assigned together with the students 
with an eye to staying within threshold in as many classrooms as possible.   
If there is no threshold, but rather a pattern of steadily increasing disruption per B 
as the number of Bs increases, then it might appear that equalizing the load across 
classrooms would minimize harm.  But the Lazear model makes clear that that is not 
necessarily the case.  The question becomes just how the behavior in question contributes 
to total harm.  If the concern (as in that model) is classroom time available for productive 
activities, then there is a limit to just how bad things can be – namely, zero productive 
                                                 
4 A related dynamic is in reference to the informal social control exerted by a community over its 
miscreants.  That capacity is also limited.  One mechanism that may be relevant is the attenuation of norms 
condemning bad behavior.  As such behavior becomes more common, the result may be an implicit 
downward shift in the cultural definition of deviance.  Daniel Patrick Moynihan popularized this idea as 
“defining deviance down.”    14 
time.  So even an explosive growth in disruptiveness (resulting from the addition of Bs to 
the classroom) will result in a muted growth in harm, asymptotic to the limit.   
In sum, if actual behavior depends on the relationship of load to control capacity, 
then the total harm resulting from a given number of Bs may be quite sensitive to their 
assignment among classrooms.  The harm-minimizing assignment will depend on the 
number of Bs relative to the number of classrooms and the capacity of ordinary 
(unspecialized) teachers to assert control.
5  
The capacity of a teacher to maintain control may be expanded through training 
and adoption of effective innovations, which in turn could affect the harm-minimizing 
assignment.  One important example is the Good Behavior Game, developed in the 1960s 
by Montrose Wolf, one of the founders of behavior analysis, with two graduate students 
(Barrish, Saunders, and Wolf, 1969; Embry, 2002).  This game adopts a simple 
behavioral strategy to help maintain order in a classroom.  The teacher divides the class 
into teams and for pre-set intervals keeps a visible scorecard of “fouls” committed by 
each team.  Teams that behave well (fewer fouls than some pre-set limit) receive a prize.  
This method has been subjected to extensive testing, including a large randomized trial 
with first graders, the Baltimore Prevention Project, in 1985-6.  The game was 
demonstrated effective at reducing classroom disruption and increasing pedagogic 
productivity; what’s more, and more surprising, it appears to have caused long-term 
improvements in behavior, so that even in sixth grade the experimental students were 
better behaved, less likely to smoke, and so forth (Kellam et al., 1998).  Dennis Embry 
                                                 
5 This summary suggests that another policy margin relevant to the segregation-integration choice is 
classroom size.  Smaller, more numerous classrooms provide an opportunity to separate deviant youths and 
expand control capacity.  General evidence that smaller classroom size is helpful to student learning is 
provided, for example, by Alan Krueger in his analysis of Tennessee’s experiment with reduced classroom 
size for students in kindergarten through third grade (Krueger, 1999).   15 
(2002) has nominated the Good Behavior Game as a “behavioral vaccine,” for its power 
to reduce impulsive, disruptive behaviors and set deviant youths on a healthier course.   
Thus the Good Behavior Game provides teachers with the capacity to reduce both 
Type D and Type S behaviors.  The harm associated with having deviant youths in the 
classroom is thereby reduced.  If the game were difficult to implement (as suggested by 
the fact that it is not currently used much in ordinary classrooms), it would provide an 
impetus to segregate deviant youths into classrooms with teachers that do use the method.   
On the other hand, if it were widely adopted, as suggested by advocates, then it would 
reduce the costs of mainstreaming deviant youths. 
 
Case III: Assignment when deviant peer influence is important 
As in Case II we assume that the behavior of deviant youths depends on the 
circumstances, but now consider a different mechanism: youths may influence each other 
directly, in addition to whatever indirect influence may occur via the dilution of 
authority. Deviant peer influence of this sort is akin to the spread of a contagious disease, 
and is often referred to as social contagion (Cook and Goss, 1996).  
We initially assume that contagious transmission for deviant behavior is limited to 
those with a propensity for that behavior.  Three recent studies from widely differing 
contexts are among those that offer general support for this assumption.  First, in the 
Baltimore Prevention Project cited above, Kellam et al. (1998) found that first graders 
with aggressive tendencies were the ones whose behavior was most affected by the 
presence of other aggressive children in the classroom.  Second an analysis of the 
influence of randomly assigned roommates for first-year students at a university found   16 
that males who had been drinkers in high school had a positive effect on the quantity of 
drinking by their college room mates, but only if that room mate had also been a drinker 
in high school (Boisjoly et al., 2003).  Third, an analysis of the post-release behavior of 
delinquents in Florida training schools found that the likelihood of post-release 
recidivism was positively related to the concentration of youths who happened to be in 
that reformatory with similar criminal histories; for example, auto thieves were more 
likely to steal again following release if they had been locked up with a relatively high 
number of other auto thieves (Bayer et al., 2003). 
In evaluating alternative assignment strategies, contagion is analytically similar to 
the problem of authority dilution.  The addition of a badly behaved individual to a 
classroom adds to the total harm directly (by his own behavior), and also indirectly 
through his influence on other deviants in the room.  This process may exhibit a threshold 
phenomenon.  In the analysis of disease epidemics, a critical point occurs where there is 
enough contact between infected contagious individuals and “susceptible” individuals so 
that each case of infection results in more than one additional case -- initiating explosive 
growth.  The concentration of deviants required to produce this result is akin to the 
capacity of a teacher to handle a load of disruption.  And the two mechanisms may be 
related substantively, as well as by analogy: the teacher’s ability to respond effectively to 
disruption may be instrumental in stopping the spread of a contagious process. 
The possibility of social influence is not limited to Type D (disruption) behavior, 
but also includes Type S.  As with auto thieves in the training-school study mentioned 
above, the behavior of a deviant youth outside of the immediate assignment may be 
influenced by who was in the same location with him.  But there is an important   17 
difference between S and D behavior in evaluating alternative assignments.  Much of the 
harm from D-behavior may fall on non-deviant classmates, but by assumption the harm 
from S-behavior is outside of that setting.  Thus one of the main justifications for 
segregation is absent in the case of S behavior. 
If S-behavior is the issue and social contagion a real possibility, then the best 
assignment depends (as usual) on the number of deviants relative to classrooms, and the 
shape of what might be called the “social-contagion function.”  If there are fewer 
deviants than classrooms, then no more than one per classroom is the harm-minimizing 
solution.  If there is more than one per classroom, it is important to know something 
about how the behavior of Bs responds to the concentration of other deviants.   Here are 
two possibilities: 
·  If social influence is characterized by a threshold phenomenon, such that social 
amplification of S behavior does not begin until there are at least n+1 deviants in 
the classroom, then the key issue is how the ratio of deviants to classrooms relates 
to that threshold.  If there are 10 classrooms and fewer than 10n deviants, then 
systematic diffusion is the harm-minimizing solution.  If social influence is 
characterized by a threshold phenomenon, but there are more than 10n deviants to 
be divided among the 10 classrooms, then a mixed approach may be best, with 
some Ss assigned to “dilute” classrooms (n deviants) and others in classrooms that 
are more concentrated.  In some cases the best assignment may include a few 
segregated classrooms with all Bs, and the rest integrated.   But it may also work 
out that equal division is the harm-minimizing solution.  Finding the best answer   18 
depends on knowing the shape of the relationship between harm and deviant 
concentration. 
·  Second is the possibility that there is contagion without a threshold, so that 
deviant influence grows stronger as the concentration of Bs in the classroom 
increases.  In other words, suppose that the addition of another B to the classroom 
tends to make each of the others more committed to deviant behavior, and that 
effect increases monotonically with the number of Bs.  In this case, the harm-
minimizing solution is (once again) equal division of Bs among available 
classrooms.   
In the introduction, we noted that our analysis of sorting and mixing is relevant to 
other domains besides deviant behavior.  Consider a quite different domain, taken from 
the influential Coleman Report of 1966.  That report analyzed the effect of racial 
segregation in schools.  The empirical analysis was based on a national sample of 
American schoolchildren.  James S. Coleman and collaborators estimated the effect of the 
racial makeup of the student’s school (percentage black) on his or her achievement test 
score.  His estimation procedure assumed that the effect was linear, and possibly different 
for black than non-black students.   
To preserve as much of the previous notation as possible, we define the following 
variables and analyze a representative school: 
  a = number of non-black students in the school (type A) 
  b= number of black students in the school  (type B) 
  k= total number of students in the school, k=a+b 
  Yi = achievement test score of student of type i  (i=A or B)   19 
  pi= constant associated with student of type i 
  ￿i= parameter indicating the effect of racial concentration   
We follow Coleman in assuming a linear relationship which may differ between groups, 
as follows: 
  Yi=pi + ￿ib/k 
If the goal is to maximize the sum of achievement-test scores for the classroom, then the 
maximand is: 
  apa + a￿ab/k + bpb + b￿bb/k 
or 
   apa + ￿ab(k-b)/k + bpb + ￿bb
2/k 
 
A couple of interesting cases come out of this setup.  If the effect of the race mix 
is the same on blacks and non-blacks, so that ￿a = ￿b =￿, then the expression simplifies to  
  apa + bpb + ￿b. 
In this case, the number of black students in the school has a linear effect on total 
achievement.  If we then sum across all schools, all that is relevant is the total number of 
black and non-black students – their distribution across schools has no effect.  So in this 
case, the decision of how to mix different types of students matters in the small (at the 
level of the individual school) but not at the systems level.  This point has been noted as 
well by other analysts of peer and neighborhood effects (Jencks and Mayer, 1990; 
Galster, Quercia and Cortes, 2000).   20 
Another possibility, made interesting by the fact that Coleman concluded that it 
best fit the data, is that the black concentration in a school affects black scores but not 
white scores.  In that case, we have the total score in the school equal to: 
  apa + bpb + ￿bb
2/k 
If we sum over all schools in the system, it turns out, assuming ￿b < 0 (as found by 
Coleman), that uniform integration is the policy that maximizes total scores. 
 
Summary 
One lesson is that an evaluation of the effects of an assignment policy for deviant 
youths should not be limited to the behavior of the youths in question.  Also required is 
an assessment of the harm to all who are affected by the assignment, including the 
bystanders. 
A slight generalization of our analysis serves as a useful summary.  The harm in 
any one classroom is a function of the number of deviant youths.  Total harm in the 
system is the sum over the classrooms.  Thus: 
  Harm in classroom c = Hc = H(bc, ac) 
  Total harm =  ￿c Hc 
If Hc is a linear function of bc, then total harm is determined only by the total number of 
Bs in the system.  But under a variety of circumstances harm is decidedly not linear in bc 
and the assignment does matter.  We reviewed cases in which there was a limited 
capacity to maintain order, existence of deviant peer influence, or harm that is not 
proportional to bad behavior (as in the case of classroom disruption).     
   21 
A full analysis would also take account of the budget impact on the relevant 
agencies, and other mechanisms that may be relevant – especially the deterrent effect of 
the threat of assignment to a segregated classroom (or training school). 
 
Empirical Issues 
In choosing an assignment policy, it would be useful to know the outcomes for all 
youths in the system for each of the options under consideration.  To keep things simple, 
suppose that only two schemes are under consideration, one that segregates deviant youth 
(T=1) and the other that “mainstreams” such youth into classrooms with non-deviant 
youth (T=0).  In a randomized experiment in which entire school systems are randomly 
assigned to the segregated or integrated conditions, the net effect of the difference in 
assignment schemes can be estimated by regressing outcomes for each youth on an 
indicator for the system’s treatment assignment.  In the equation below, a limited number 
of parameters are to be estimated, allowing for different intercepts and response 
coefficients for non-deviant (A) and deviant (B) youths.  The residual terms ￿c and ￿i 
represent other characteristics of classrooms and individuals respectively that affect the 
outcome; because of random assignment, the distribution of these characteristics will be 
balanced across treatment conditions (that is, orthogonal to the assignment indicator T).  
In this equation, the variable Ii is an indicator for whether the individual is type A (Ii=1) 
or B (Ii=0). 
Yi = ￿ + ￿Ii  + ￿A  Ii*Ti + ￿B  (1-Ii)*Ti   + ￿c + ￿i   
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In this setup, ￿A provides an estimate of the average effect on As of segregated 
classrooms, while ￿B  provides the same information for the Bs.  A weighted average of 
these two coefficients would provide an overall estimate.  The relationship between these 
estimates and “harm” depends on the nature of the outcome measure.  Positive ￿s indicate 
segregation is harmful if the outcome measure is crime, injury, absenteeism, or smoking.  
If the outcome is an achievement test score, then a positive ￿ indicates that segregation is 
beneficial. 
In practice there may be a number of outcome measures that are deemed relevant.  
A complete analysis would require combining them in some fashion to produce an 
comprehensive measure of welfare (Nagin, 2001).  
This group assignment experiment highlights conditions under which analysts 
could reliably compare two (or more) assignment practices.  This ideal is rarely achieved 
in practice.  Among the limitations of available research literature are inadequate 
measurement and uncertain interpretation. 
Measurement. Often, the outcome measures are limited to one or several 
measures of the behavior of the target youth (usually the deviant youths).  That approach 
is inadequate if the behavior of other youths may also be affected by the assignment.  
Furthermore, data on the behavior measures, even if collected for all youths, may not 
adequately capture the effects on welfare, as in the case of classroom disruption, bullying, 
and so forth. 
Adding up.  A comprehensive assessment should consider the system-wide 
effects, although that is not standard practice.  For example, a finding that the behavior of 
Bs tends to deteriorate in the presence of a high concentration of Bs may be presented as   23 
evidence that Bs should be integrated.  But that conclusion does not necessarily follow, 
since it only looks at the costs of concentration, and not the possible benefits to those 
classrooms and students that avoid contact with Bs in a concentrated assignment. 
Self-selection.  The Coleman Report cited above provides one well-known 
example of estimating peer effects on youth outcomes.  Coleman’s estimates, like most 
estimates of peer effects in the literature, were based on natural variation rather than 
experimentally induced variation.  In “nature,” students in integrated classrooms are 
likely to differ in relevant ways from students in segregated classrooms.  Coleman’s 
analysis attempts to adjust for this problem by controlling for measures of family 
background and other student characteristics available to him in his data set (the EEOC).  
But those measures are far from comprehensive.  Inevitably there remains the question:  
Why do two observationally equivalent minority students wind up in very different types 
of schools? 
Suppose, for example, that parents who choose an integrated school for their 
children tend to have different attitudes toward race and education on average than those 
who choose a more segregated school.  (“Choice” in this case may be exercised by 
choosing where to live or choosing between private and public schools.)  If African-
American parents who are most committed to education are the ones who manage to 
navigate their child’s way into an integrated setting, and parent competence and attitudes 
cannot be “controlled for” (because they are not measured adequately), then Coleman’s 
analysis and similar non-experimental estimates will confound the effects of unmeasured 
parent attributes with the effects of school racial composition.  Put differently, the self-
selection of families and youth into different educational or other social settings may   24 
compromise the internal validity of estimates for peer effects on youth outcomes, causing 
biased estimates. 
Self-selection could also affect the external validity (generalizability) of estimates 
of peer effects if peer influences differ among settings.  For example, suppose that in the 
mid 1960’s, when the EEOS was collected, minority families who sent their children to 
integrated school settings only did so in areas where the local white population was 
relatively progressive and open to the idea of school desegregation.  In this case the effect 
of racial desegregation on whites in desegregated schools may be quite different from the 
hypothetical effect on whites of integrating all-white schools.  Introducing minority 
students to all-white schools may have more negative effects on the whites in those 
schools (and the newly introduced black students as well) than the estimates in the 
Coleman Report would suggest. (For more on the issue of “local average treatment 
effects,” see Imbens and Angrist, 1994, and Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996). 
Classrooms, Control or Contagion?  Even if, despite the self-selection problem, 
the parameter estimates are valid, there remains the question of just what can be learned 
from them.  The parameters measuring peer context in a standard observational study do 
not identify the causal mechanism that is responsible for the estimated effect.  Possible 
mechanisms include social contagion, the effects of “load” on control, and unmeasured or 
poorly measured aspects of the classroom environment itself (Manski, 1993).  
Understanding the mechanism is usually important in designing an appropriate 
assignment and related policies.   
This discussion suggests that standard practice within the empirical literature on 
peer effects is unlikely to be informative about the net impact of different assignment   25 
processes within our public-school or juvenile-justice systems.  But there is a growing 
experimental literature that eliminates most of the self-selection problem and is helpful in 
other respects as well.  Here we review a small sample of such experiments.  
 
First-year dormitory assignments 
Many residential colleges and universities assign some first-year students to 
dormitory rooms more-or-less at random.  That assignment scheme provides a natural 
experiment for studying peer effects.  Usually membership in social groupings is 
influenced in part by individual choice, which makes it difficult to distinguish the effects 
of the group from the characteristics of the people who tend to join that group.  Random 
assignment eliminates that problem.  In one study, randomly assigned roommates at a 
large mid- western university were found to influence each others drinking under some 
circumstances (Boisjoly et al., 2003).  The effect was only found for males, and only 
when both roommates had been drinkers in high school – drinking in college by those 
who had been abstainers in high school was not affected by first-year roommate 
assignment.  But when two drinkers were assigned to the same room, the effect (in the 
male dorms) was to amplify their drinking. 
If the university’s goal were to reduce drinking by undergraduates, then these 
results are sufficient to point the way.  It would be advisable in making dormitory 
assignments to match high-school abstainers with drinkers.  That conclusion is strongest 
if drinking is primarily a Type S behavior rather than a Type D behavior.  If on the other 
hand a roommate’s drinking tends to negatively affect the quality of life in the dorm 
room (a Type D behavior), then the normative circumstance is more complicated.  It   26 
could be argued that the abstainers should be spared the disruptive influence of a drinking 
roommate, even if the total prevalence of alcohol problems would be reduced by forced 
integration. 
 
Baltimore Prevention Project 
In the Baltimore Prevention Project, introduced above, first graders were assigned 
to classrooms on a random basis.  Sheppard Kellam and colleagues (Kellam et al., 1998) 
evaluated the effects on behavior of this assignment (and the application of the Good 
Behavior Game) years later, when the children were in sixth grade.  One finding was that 
the initial assignment had a long-term effect on the behavior of the most aggressive boys.  
Those who were identified as aggressive in first grade behaved worse five years later if 
they happened (by chance) to end up in a first-grade classroom with a relatively high 
concentration of other aggressive boys. 
Because the initial assignment was made randomly, it can be concluded with 
some confidence that Kellam’s finding reflects a causal process involving peer effects.  
Perhaps the first-grade exposure to other aggressive boys exacerbated their tendencies, or 
perhaps the first grade provided an opportunity for the aggressive boys to find each other 
and become troublemaking companions thereafter.   
What does this finding imply about assigning aggressive children to first grade 
classrooms?  Assuming we only care about their subsequent behavior, and that behavior 
translates into social harm in a straightforward (additive) manner, then the answer could 
potentially be derived from the analysis of these data.  Given an estimated relationship 
between first-grade class composition and subsequent behavior, simulations could be run   27 
to determine the total amount of trouble associated with different hypothetical 
assignments.  The best assignment may well be an even distribution of these boys among 
classes, but not necessarily – if they are sufficiently prevalent, it may be best to 
concentrate some of them and diffuse the rest.  In any event, the “right” answer would 
require that the objectives be identified explicitly. 
 
Moving to Opportunity 
The best available evidence to date on the existence of “neighborhood effects” on 
youth outcomes derives from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 
Moving to Opportunity (MTO) housing-voucher experiment.  MTO overcame the self-
selection problem that plagued previous studies of neighborhood effects by randomly 
assigning public housing families who volunteered for the demonstration into different 
mobility treatment groups, two of which were offered housing vouchers to move to 
lower-poverty areas and one of which – the control group – received no additional 
services under the program. 
Short-term findings from MTO suggested that moving from high- to low-poverty 
neighborhoods reduces youth involvement in problem behavior and may increase 
achievement test scores (Kling, Katz and Liebman, 2001; Ludwig, Duncan and 
Hirschfield, 2001; Ludwig, Ladd and Duncan, 2001; Goering and Feins, 2003).  
Additional years’ worth of post-randomization data suggest that moving to a 
neighborhood with less poverty produces lasting behavioral benefits among adolescent 
girls but not boys (Kling and Liebman, 2004; Kling, Ludwig and Katz, 2004).   28 
Most relevant for our purposes, MTO tells us nothing about the effects of moving 
youth across neighborhoods on those who reside in either the origin or destination 
neighborhoods of MTO participants.  The harms to neighbors of Type D behavior are 
ignored.  For that reason it is not possible to assess the net social benefit of the mobility 
induced by the experimental intervention.  Even more problematic is projecting what 
would happen if housing vouchers were offered to all public-housing families under the 
same terms as the MTO experimental group.   
 
School Vouchers 
   As another example, consider the case of school vouchers, which, like housing 
vouchers, help move youths to new social settings.  Much of the recent evidence comes 
from local randomized housing-voucher experiments.  The first and perhaps best-known 
program comes from Milwaukee.  While students in Milwaukee were not actually 
randomly assigned to “voucher” or “no voucher” groups, as in a classical randomized 
experiment, private schools in the program that had more applicants than slots were 
required to admit students on the basis of a random lottery.  In this sense the Milwaukee 
voucher program provides a particularly credible natural experiment; the best available 
study of Milwaukee suggests that attending private rather than public school produces 
gains in math but not in reading (Rouse, 1998). 
More recent voucher programs in New York City, Washington, DC and Dayton, 
Ohio use formal randomized experimental designs and yield suggestive evidence of 
positive private-school effects, at least on some students in some grades, although the 
experimental designs behind these programs is undermined somewhat by response rates   29 
to the follow-up surveys used to measure student outcomes that are lower than one might 
wish (Howell and Peterson, 2002; Howell, Wolf, Campbell and Peterson, 2002).
6  
In all of these school-voucher experiments, the causal mechanism is not well 
identified.  It could be that the private schools offer better instruction on average, or that 
the peer environment is more conducive to academic achievement.  If the latter 
mechanism is part of the mix, then the system-wide effects of a voucher program may be 
quite different than the effects on those who take up the vouchers.  For example, suppose 
that those who volunteer for these voucher experiments are among the best students in 
their old public schools but now among the weakest students in their new private schools.  
In this case their take-up of the voucher offer leads to a reduction in average student 
quality in both the origin and destination schools. If individual achievement is positively 
influenced by the average quality of peers, then the result would be that the voucher 
students would benefit (by association with better students) while all others – both public 
and private – would lose.   So once again we need a more comprehensive measure. 
 
System-level studies 
The case of school vouchers provides a useful example of the distinction between 
“mover” and “systems-level” studies.  What would happen to the average achievement of 
all American youth if our country adopted a large-scale school voucher program?  
                                                 
6 If we were certain that the characteristics of non-respondents in the voucher treatment and control groups 
were on average identical then relatively low response rates would reduce the statistical bias of the analysis 
but not introduce bias.  However as an incentive to participate in follow-up surveys, control group families 
who responded to these surveys were entered into a new voucher lottery (Howell, Wolf, Campbell and 
Peterson, 2002, p. 196).  This raises the possibility that the voucher treatment group respondents may have 
been the families who were most satisfied with their voucher experiences while the control responders 
consisted disproportionately of those families who were least satisfied with their public school experience.  
This response pattern would lead the analysis to overstate the effects of voucher receipt on achievement.   30 
Because no such system has ever been implemented in the United States, we cannot 
answer this question directly.  But intriguing evidence on this point comes from Chile, 
which has offered students private-school vouchers for the past two decades. 
The number of new private schools that operate in Chile has increased 
substantially over this time, with the growth in the size of the new private sector varying 
considerably across metropolitan areas within Chile over time.  Chang-Tai Hsieh and 
Miguel Urquiola (2002) estimate the effects of this resorting program by comparing 
trends in average student outcomes across metropolitan areas within Chile that 
experienced differential growth in the local private school market. 
Their “difference-in-difference” analysis suggests that Chile’s school voucher 
program has redistributed students from public to private schools.  As a result, average 
test scores have declined in the public schools and increased in private schools.  That 
pattern may in principle be the result of the concurrent effects of several mechanisms: the 
direct effects and peer effects of changes in the quality of the public and private student 
enrollees, as well as productivity changes in private and public schools.  It is telling in 
this respect that the aggregate effect of the growth in the private school market appears to 
be nil – when public and private students are considered together, areas that had more 
voucher-induced movement into private schools did no better than students in areas with 
less movement.  These results suggest that whatever gains the “switchers” enjoyed were 
compensated by losses to those left behind in the public schools.   
The Chilean experience highlights the tradeoff between mover experiments and 
systems-level studies.  The former provide highly credible evidence on the effects of 
assignment policies on a sub-set of youth within the social system of interest, but provide   31 
limited information about systems-level effects.  Studies conducted at the systems level, 
on the other hand, capture the overall effects of changing assignment procedures within a 
system.  However these systems-level studies come at the cost of losing the experimental 
variation that drives differences in peer settings in mover studies.  In the case of Chile, 
the private school sector developed more rapidly in large, urban, wealthy metropolitan 
areas.  Whether changes over time in student outcomes within smaller, rural areas of 
Chile provides a good control group for large wealthy areas is not clear. 
 
Recommendations for Research 
The main lesson from the analysis above is that when deviants’ behavior is either 
influenced by social context, or victimizes bystanders, a complete evaluation may require 
going well beyond observations on the deviants themselves.  The study of first-year 
dormitory assignments was especially illuminating because it included information on the 
college drinking behavior of roommates who were “non deviant” in that they did not 
drink in high school; the study may be considered deficient in that it did not include 
measures of disruption within the dormitory setting.  An important limitation of the MTO 
study was that it lacked measures of the effects of those who relocated under the program 
on either their new neighborhoods or their old neighborhoods. 
The problem, of course, is that a more comprehensive study tends to be more 
costly to implement.  Judging whether it is worthwhile to measure contextual effects in 
any given evaluation project requires knowledge of when they are likely to be important.   
The accumulation of such knowledge should be a goal of any long term research strategy.   
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Normative considerations 
Empirical evidence, even when reliable, is inevitably an incomplete guide to 
formulating assignment policies for deviant youths.  Also needed is a clear statement of 
values.  Here we offer several observations, focusing on how to take account of the 
possibility of deviant peer contagion. 
If the welfare of the deviant youths is the benchmark for judging policy, then 
negative effects from clustering such youths for the delivery of services are of great 
concern.  The possibility that an intervention would actually do harm to the group that it 
was intended to help is not just ironic, but downright scandalous.  That’s the power of 
Joan McCord’s findings concerning the summer camps for the Cambridge-Somerville 
Study’s delinquent youths; she concludes that by concentrating such youths for an 
extended period, the camp experience not only did not set them straight, but actually 
served to reinforce their deviant propensities (McCord, 2003).   
The Hippocratic stricture  “First do no harm,” applies in this case: physicians are 
to be especially sensitive to the possibility that their prescriptions will hurt rather than 
help their patients.  While the operational significance of this stricture is not clear, it may 
be a useful check on the tendency to demonstrate professional know-how by offering 
some active remedy, rather than let nature take its course.  Of course, even well-advised 
remedies may be harmful for some patients, but “evidence based medicine” is supposed 
to be guided by the empirical probabilities, insisting on an expectation of benefit and the 
informed consent of the patient or his or her guardians. 
While this standard is not irrelevant to assignment policies for deviant youths, it 
should be noted that the choice between mainstreaming and some form of segregation   33 
brings into play the welfare of other youths – those who would have more or less contact 
with the deviant youths depending on the assignment – and, of course, cost.  If 
mainstreaming is good (on average) for the deviant youths, but harmful (on average) to 
the others, then the welfare of the deviants alone may be deemed an inadequate standard 
for making the judgment.  But there is no consensus on this matter. 
Indeed, since the 1970’s those who favor mainstreaming children with mental and 
physical disability have the dominant voice in school-assignment policies.  Public Law 
94-192 guaranteed children with disabilities the right to an education in a mainstreamed 
setting with their peers, rather than in separate classrooms (Dodge, Kupersmidt, and 
Fontaine, n.d., p. 42).  In the Willie M case beginning in 1979, this right was extended by 
a federal court to violent delinquents with mental health problems.  Among the 
advocates’ arguments are that first, mainstreaming is in the disabled youths’ interest, and 
second, that their interest should be given priority over other considerations, including 
financial cost and classroom management problems.   
Suppose that we accept the principle of a rebuttable presumption that deviant 
youths should be mainstreamed.  The rebuttal then might take one of several forms: first, 
an argument that with available resources and technology, deviant youths would make 
better progress in a segregated setting; second, that other youths would benefit from 
removing certain deviant peers to segregated settings; or third, that a particular class of 
deviant youths did not deserve the “mainstreaming” presumption because they should be 
held culpable for their actions (rather than deemed “disabled”).  The first two of these 
arguments would be based on empirical evidence.   
Several observations about such arguments follow from the analysis in this paper:   34 
Since the evidence on the consequences of alternative assignment policies for 
deviant youths and other youths is typically incomplete or weak, rejecting the null 
hypothesis (rebuttable presumption) is going to be difficult in practice.  Where 
mainstreaming is the norm, as in public schools, the presumption will be difficult 
to overcome, given the difficulties of inferring causal effects from available 
evidence.  In those cases where there is experimental evidence, it is typically 
incomplete.  So even when the preponderance of the evidence suggests that 
mainstreaming would cause more harm overall than segregation, that conclusion 
will not be beyond reasonable doubt.   
On the other hand, if there is no presumption of mainstreaming (as in 
public housing policy, for example, or with respect to youthful offenders who are 
not deemed disabled), then the preponderance of the evidence should rule, and the 
interests of all who are affected be taken into account.  In that case the more 
complete analysis of harm suggested in our analysis above is relevant in principle, 
although still difficult in practice.  A finding that concentrating deviant youths 
tends to facilitate negative peer influence makes a difference, but only as one of 
several relevant mechanisms. 
The complexities introduced by uncertainty about the effects of alternative 
policies, and concerns about how those effects are distributed, can be illustrated by the 
example of a school-system assignment policy that is to be guided by projected effects on 
an end-of-grade achievement test.  The hypothetical choice is between mainstreaming a 
group of deviant students, and concentrating them in special classrooms or a separate 
school.  Evidence is available on how the choice of assignment will affect achievement   35 
test scores for each group; the evidence yields probability distributions of results for 
deviant students, other students, and overall.  Here are several of the possible decision 
rules, in order of increasing sensitivity to the welfare of the deviant group: 
1.  Choose segregation unless Mainstreaming causes a higher expected achievement 
score for the non-deviant group.   
This standard might be considered if the deviant group in question were 
deemed to be criminals or otherwise blameworthy, and deserving of 
assignment to a segregated setting. 
2.  Choose the assignment that has the higher overall expected average achievement 
score (averaging deviants with others). 
3.  Choose Mainstreaming unless reliable evidence indicates that there is at least a  
95% chance that the deviant students will have higher average scores if separated. 
This standard is the implementation of the “rebuttable presumption” in 
favor of mainstreaming. 
4.  Choose the assignment that has the higher expected average achievement score 
for the deviant students, regardless of the effect on the other students. 
The interplay of values and statistical reasoning presents an interesting challenge for 
policymakers in this case and similar cases in other domains.   36 
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